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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for this appeal from the First Circuit of Box
Elder County, Brigham City Department, to the Court of Appeals is
proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2A-3.

ii .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Did the opinion of the majority err in holding that the
arresting officer did not exceed the purpose and scope of the
detention in demanding to see the driver's license of Defendant,
Steven Murphy.
II.
Did the opinion of the majority err in holding that there is
no evidence in the record that the Defendants were detained
against their will at the point in time when the arresting officer
asked to see the driver's license of Defendant, Steven Murphy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts upon which the parties rely for this appeal are
contained in a written narative by the arresting officer which was
made part of the record in the trial court and a copy of which was
included in the appendix of the original brief filed by Appellants
in this matter.
On October 3, 1986 the arresting officer received a radio
call from another police officer.

This second officer stated that

he had seen the vehicle owned by Defendant, Darrell Murphy# and
that he believed that Darrell was driving.

The second officer

also informed the arresting officer that Darrell's operator's
license was suspended.

The arresting officer went to the area

where the vehicle had been seen; and observed the vehicle.

The

officer called the dispatcher and verified that in fact Darrell's
license was suspended.

The officer ther} states that as the

i

vehicle was making a turn in front of him, his headlights
illuminated the interior of the vehicle and specifically the
driver's face.

At this point it appeared to him that the driver

was in fact Darrell'Murphy.

The officer then stopped the vehicle

and approached the driver's side window.

Upon seeing the driver,

the officer realized that he was mistaken in his belief that the
driver was Darrell.

The driver of the vehicle was Defendant,

Steven Murphy, Darrell's older brother.
fact seated in the passenger side.

Darrell Murphy was in

The officer explained the

reason for the stop, ie. his belief that Darrell was driving the
car, to which Darrell responded, "I know I'm on suspension, that's
why he is driving".

The officer then asked Steven to produce his

license, to which Steven replied that he did not have his license
with him.

The officer then proceeded back to his patrol car to

check the status of Steven's license.
Steven was also on suspension.

The report came back that

Upon returning to the Defendants'

vehicle the officer stated that he noticed a smell of alcohol
coming from Steven's breath; and later a similar odor from
Darrell's breath.

Based upon this suspicion, further

investigation resulted in the arrest of both Defendants.
Defendants thereafter moved to suppress all of the evidence
against them; and this motion was denied.

Defendants were

convicted after a trial and thereafter appealed.

The Court of

Appeals in a two to one decision ruled that; 1) the demand of the
officer to see the license of Steven Murphy was within the scope
of the original stop; and 2) that there was no evidence in the

record that at the time the officer demanded the license, the
Defendants were detained against their will.

Defendants now

petition for a rehearing.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The opinion of the majority, holding that the purpose for the
initial investigative stop of the Defendants' vehicle was to
determine if the operator had a valid license, is overly broad and
not supported by the facts.

The reason that the officer stopped

the vehicle was to first determine if Defendant, Darrell Murphy,
was the driver; and second, if in fact Darrell was the driver, did
he have a valid license.

In addition, the officer's demand that

Defendant, Steven Murphy, produce his driver's license was clearly
not within the scope of the purpose of the initial stop in as much
as there were no specific facts known to the officer upon which he
could have formed a reasonable suspicion that Steven was engaged
in any illegal activity.
The opinion of the majority that there is no evidence that
the Defendants were detained against their will after the initial
stop is unreasonable under the facts; and is a misapplication of
the law as set forth in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, (Utah,
1987).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
The majority opinion erred in holding that the police
officer's demand that Defendant, Steven Murphy, produce his
driver's license was within the scope of the initial stop.

The majority in its opinion, dated March 18, 1988, states:
"The purpose of the stop was not fulfilled when
Steven was found to be the driver. The purpose of the
stop was not fulfilled when Steven was asked but failed
to produce his operator's license. The purpose was
fulfilled only when the officer contacted the dispatcher
and discovered the status of the operator's license. The
officer was at all time acting within the proper scope of
the stop..."
This conclusion is not consistent with the facts.

The

officer states in his narrative that he received a radio report
from another officer that the vehicle of Defendant, Darrell
Murphy, had been seen and that Darrell was possibly driving while
his license was suspended.

Once the officer located the vehicle,

he checked with dispatch and was informed that Darrell's license
was in fact suspended.

The officer stated that as the vehicle

turned in front of his car and the lights from his car illuminated
the inside of Defendants' vehicle, he thought the person driving
was Darrell.

There really can be no doubt that the reason the

officer stopped the vehicle was to find out whether or not Darrell
was in fact driving; and if so, was his license suspended.

The

opinion of the majority would seem to suggest that the purpose of
the stop was to determine if the operator of the vehicle, whoever
it might have been, had a valid license.
case,.

This simply is not the

The officer was not investigating just any operator; but

rather was investigating a specific operator, Darrell Murphy.

The

information that officer had available was not about just any
operator; but about a particular operator, Darrell Murphy.

The

opinion of the majority would seem to ignore the specific facts of
this case.

For example, had the officer not have been acquainted

with either Defendant; and simply stopped the vehicle based upon
the report that the driver was possibly on suspension, then the
officer would have needed to ask to see the license of the person
who was driving simply to determine if he was in fact the person
whose license was possibly suspended.

Or if the officer had not

been able to distinguish between the two brothers, then it would
have been appropriate to ask for the license of the driver to
determine if he was in fact the one possibly on suspension.
However the fact is that the officer was acquainted with both
brothers and knew immediately that the driver was not Darrell.
The opinion of the majority with respect! to the purpose of the
detention would seem to be overly broad; and would seem to ignore
the specific facts that the officer had available to him.
If in fact the arresting officer was at all times acting
within the scope and purpose of the initial detention, as the
opinion of the majority states, then his actions should be able to
meet the scrutiny of the reasonable suspicion standard.

That is

to say that the officer should be able to articulate specific
facts that led him to reasonably believe that Defendant, Steven
Murphy, had or was about to commit a crime.

If the totality of

the circumstances do not justify any such reasonable suspicion,
then the action of the officer in demanc(ing that Steven produce
his license would have to be outside the scope and purpose of the
stop.

Again, an examination of the facts clearly shows that the

officer had no suspicion with respect to Steven at all.

It is

undisputed that all of the information which the officer had was

related to Darrell.
the vehicle.

It was Darrell whom was suspected of driving

It was Darrell*s license which the officer calLed

dispatch to check.

It was Darrell that the officer thought he saw

when his headlights illuminated the inside of the vehicle.

There

was absolutely no reason for the officer to suspect that Steven
had been engaged or was about to egage in any illegal activity.
As noted above, it would seem that the opinion of the majority has
overlooked the fact that the officer was acquainted with both
Defendants and that the officer knew immediately upon approaching
the vehicle that the driver was not Darrell, but rather Steven.
But since the officer did know both Defendants and did recognize
the driver as Steven, this information must be taken into
consideration when determining the whether or not there was a
reasonable suspicion that the driver, Steven, was engaged in any
illegal activity.

The majority in its opinion quoting from State

v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah, 1987) and United States v.
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984) states:
"...an officer may seize a person if the officer
has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop".. . (emphasis added) .
It would seem clear that the majority opinion erred in holding
that the officer was at all times acting within the proper scope
of the stop; and that the detention of Defendants lasted no longer
than was necessary for the officer to effectuate the purpose of
the stop.

It would also seem clear that based upon the specific

facts of the case, there was no articulable suspicion that Steven

Murphy had or was about to engage in illegal conduct; and
consequently that the Defendants were unreasonable "seized".
POINT II.
The opinion of the majority erred in holding that there is no
evidence that the Defendants were detained against their will at
the point in time that the officer requested to see the license of
Defendant, Steven Murphy.
The opinion of the majority states
"The officer, therefore, is properly standing
beside vehicle. Absent any suspicion, Deitman permits
the officer to ask questions of the driver so long as
the driver is not detained against his will. An
examination of the narrative fails to show any
indication of detention."
The opinion of the majority is based upon the holding in State v.
Deitman, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court, quoting from, United
States v. Merritt, supra, states:
"...an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will;..."
The opinion of the majority, however, would seem to be overlooking
the facts of this case; and would seem to be misapplying the rule
°f Deitman and Merritt.

The majority does acknowledge that the

Defendants were initially stopped against their will when the
officer pulled them over.

The opinion of the majority would also

seem to accept that the Defendants were detained against their
will while the officer was walking up to their car.

However,

somehow when the officer reaches the car and learns that the
driver is not Darrell, but rather Steven, the Defendants are no
longer being detained.

This court, in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)
quoting from United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct.
1870 (1980) stated:
"When a reasonable person, based on the totality
of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but
because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure
occurs."
In United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.
1986) the court stated:
"There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters
with respect to Fourth Amendment; police-citizen
communications involving no coercion or detention, which
do not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny, brief
seizures involving reasonably brief encounters in which
reasonable person would have believed that he or she
was not free to leave, which require showing by
government of reasonable articulable suspicion that
person has committed or is about commit crime, and full
scale arrests, which are more intrusive encounters
requiring probable cause." (emphasis added).
The court should have applied this "reasonable person" test to
determine if the Defendants were detained against their will.
would appear that the majority did not.

It

The facts are that the

arresting officer stopped the Defendants vehicle at approximately
11:25 pm., presumably through some audio and/or visual signal.
There is no question that this was against the will of Defendants.
The officer next proceeded to the driver's side where he realized
that the driver was Steven and that Darrell was seated in the
passenger side.

The officer next explained to Defendants the

reason for the stop; and then requested that Steven produce a
driver's

license.

Iftien S t e v e n c o u l d n o t ,

the officer

requested

the necessary information from Steven with which to call dispatch

to check the license.

Applying the "reasonable person" test then#

would a reasonable person in the position of Defendants, believe
that he or she was at any point free to leave.

The majority

opinion would seem to indicate that the detention ended somewhere
between the officer recognizing Steven as the driver and Darrell
as the passenger, and the officer asking Steven for his license.
Would a reasonable person have believed that he or she was free to
leave at this point in time?

Should the Defendants have

reasonably believed that they were free to simply roll up the
window and drive away unhindered?

And if so, what specific fact

could a reasonable person point to as the indication that he or
she was no longer required to remain?

What indication did the

officer give that the Defendants were free to leave?

Obviously,

a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was
free to leave.

The officer gave no indication, spoken or

otherwise, that the detention he had just effected, under the
color of his authority as a peace officer, was at an end.

A

reasonable person would have believed th^t he or she was required
to do exactly what the Defendants did, remain and respond.
The majority also seems to be misapplying the standard of
Deitman, supra.

Deitman, involved a situation where the officer

asked the suspects if they would mind speaking with him.

The

suspects voluntarily crossed the street to meet the officer and
produced identification when requested.

There had been no prior

detention of the suspects as was the case with Defendants.
Defendants do no claim that what is initially a detention against

will cannot evolve into something less; but there would seem to
have to be some point in time where a reasonable person would
believe that he or she was free to go and voluntarily choose to
remain•

This is clearly not the case with Defendants.

The

Defendants could not have reasonably believed that they were free
to leave after the officer had stopped their vehicle and
approached on the driver's side; and consequently they were in
fact still being detained against their will.
CONCLUSION
The opinion of the majority erred in holding that the
arresting officer was at all times acting within the scope of the
stop.

l/hen the officer requested that Steven produce his license

he went beyond the scope of the stop, in as much as he had no
articulable suspicion that Steven had been engaged in any illegal
activity.

The detention of Defendants lasted longer than was

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and the "seizure"
was therefore unreasonable.
The opinion of the majority also erred in holding that there
is no evidence that the Defendants were detained against their
will at the time that the officer requested that Steven produce
his license.

A reasonable person would not have believed that he

or she was free to leave; and therefore the Defendants were
detained against their will.
Defendants respectfully request that the court reverse the
decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to
suppress; or in the alternative, that the court grant further

rehearing of this case.
DATED this / *&T day of May, 1988.
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